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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the doctrine of predatory pricing. Chapter 1 introduces the 
topic and outlines the framework of this paper. 
Chapter 2 analyses the development of the doctrine in the United States and 
examines the economic tests established to detemune the existence of predatory 
pncmg. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse whether Australia and New Zealand have adopted any of 
the American tests, or any elements of those tests as detemunative of the existence 
of predatory pricing. 
Chapter 5 concludes that Australia and New Zealand have proved unwilling to 
adopt any defined criteria in order to prove the existence of predatory pricing 
behaviour, preferring instead a total rule of reason approach based on an analysis of 
purpose. This approach has rendered the success of such predatory pricing claims 
in Australasian jurisdictions inherently unlikely. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 15,000 words . 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 This paper examines the doctrine of predatory pricing from its origins in the 
United States, through to the application of the concept in Australia and New 
Zealand. 
2 One of the fundamental problems in examining the doctrine of predatory pricing 
and its application in any jmisdiction is that there is no generally accepted 
definition of the doctrine, nor is it generally accepted that the phenomenon 
actually exists. 
3 In essence, predatory p1icing can be described as an extreme fom1. of price 
disc1imination which can be distinguished from legitimate price discrimination in 
that the reduction in price is undertaken for an anti-competitive purpose. The 
greatest difficulty in establishing an appropriate test for predatory pricing is that the 
conduct itself, p1ice reduction, is the quintessence of competition. 
4 The development of the doctrine in the United States has been based upon 
attempts to provide quasi-scientific economic tests to indicate when such p1ice 
reductions could be assumed to be anti-competitive. Those tests fall into two main 
categories: the cost based tests and more recently, the recoupment tests. 
:i Chapter 2 of this paper examines the development of the American cost based and 
recoupment tests, the application of those tests by the American courts, and the 
criticisms levelled at those tests which centre on the artificial nature of such 
economic-legal hybrids. 
6 Chapters 3 and 4 of this paper analyse whether Australia and New Zealand 
recognise the doctrine of predatory pricing as developed in the United States, and 
whether either common-law jurisdiction has adopted any of the American tests, or 
any elements of those tests, as determinative, or even indicative, of the existence of 
predatory pricing. 
7 The analysis demonstrates that whilst the Australian and New Zealand lower courts 
have been prepared to utilise relevant elements of the American tests in order to 
assist in an assessment of whether predation has occurred, they have not been 
willing to incorporate the doct1ine of predatory pricing as having any independent 
existence outside of the relevant statutory prohibitions on use of dominance for 
anti-competitive purposes. 
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8 Moreover, both Australian and New Zealand appellate tribunals have exhibited 
extreme reluctance to incorporate any elements of the tests posited in the United 
States as conclusive or even preliminary indicators of predatory behaviour. 
9 Instead, both the Australian and New Zealand appellate courts have repeatedly 
emphasised the paramount nature of the actual elements of the relevant statutory 
provisions, and in particular the requirement for a proscribed purpose, over any 
other potentially relevant test. 
10 Chapter 5 of this paper concludes that whilst Australian and New Zealand judicial 
reluctance to be fettered by precedents which have evolved from a different 
statutory and constitutional setting; or by quasi-scientific tests which purport to, 
but do not actually, offer objective proof of predation, is understandable; their 
alternative total rule of reason approach based purely on an analysis of purpose has 
its own limitations. 
l l In failing to provide any effective analytical framework for assessing the elements 
necessary to prove predation, and in potentially foreclosing an examination of 
other factors which may be useful to an assessment of predation, including the 
significance of economic data, the success of such claims in Australasian 
jurisdictions is rendered inherently unlikely. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE UNITED STATES APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
1 The doctrine of predatory pricing is credited with having first evolved in the 
United States in the 1970s, mainly as a result of the efforts of renowned American 
economists Areeda and Turner. 
Ajirlll which drives out or excludes rivals by selling at 1mre111unerative prices 
is not co111peti11g on the 111erits, but wgaging in behavio11r that may properly 
be called predatory. 
1 
2 The development of the doctrine in the United States has been based upon 
attempts to provide quasi-scientific economic tests to indicate when such p1ice 
reductions could be assumed to be anti-competitive. Those tests fall into two main 
categories: the cost based tests and more recently, the recoupment test. 
3 
THE UN[TED STATES TESTS FOR PREDATION 
Cost- based Tests 
Cost-based tests developed principally as an attempt to introduce some 
"objectivity" or scientific validity into the investigation of predatory pricing, in the 
sense that the offence could be proved conclusively by the presentation of costs 
based data. The cost-based tests are essentially an adaptation of the microecononlic 
models developed by economists to establish the relationship between cost and 
p1ice for a particular firm. The focus of the cost-based tests is to determine the 
pricing level at which predatory intent would be presumed. Essentially, all cost 
based tests for predation assume that level will be found where price is below some 
measure of cost. However, much debate has centred over how to determine the 
appropriate measure of cost. 
An examination of the most widely used of the cost-based tests, the Areeda & 
Turner test, its application by the United States courts, and the criticisms levelled 
at that test, is set out below. The application of the cost-based tests to an analysis 
P Areeda & D Turner, Predatory Prici11.I! 1111d Related Practices under Section 2 iif t/1e Sherman Act, 1975 
Harvard Law Review, p697. 
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of predatory pricing by the Australian and New Zealand courts and competition 
law authorities is considered in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively below. 
Areeda and Turner Test 
The most well known of the cost-based tests, and the one that has been most 
frequently applied by American courts, is that proposed by American economists 
Areeda and Turner in 1975.
2 
Areeda and Turner considered that historically the 
treatment of predatory pricing in the cases and the literature had suffered from a 
failure to delineate the doctrine clearly, and accordingly, sought to establish a clear 
trademark test for detemiining the existence of predatory pricing. 
6 Areeda and Turner analysed a nun1.ber of possible cost based tests for determining 
predatory pricing and concluded that short run marginal cost provided the 
definitive benchmark by which to establish predation. 
7 
8 
Areeda and Turner noted that when a monopolist sells at a price at or above 
average cost - that is, total revenues just cover total losses, but could earn greater 
shortrun profits at a higher price, the firm is likely to be charging the lower price 
in order to preserve or enhance its market share by deterring rivals. However, 
they concluded that as long as price was not below average total cost, or marginal 
cost, such pricing behaviour would only exclude less-efficient rivals and should not 
be deemed predatory. Areeda Turner concede that such pricing behaviour would 
also exclude equally efficient 1ivals, but regard that as an acceptable trade off to 
avoid over-regulation. 
As only prices below short run marginal cost would exclude more efficient rivals, 
Areeda and Turner concluded that prices below that benchmark should be 
automatically assumed to be predatory and any price above that should be deemed 
non-predatory. The so-called "b1ightline" test. Recognising that marginal cost is 
often difficult to ascertain, average variable cost was considered a sufficient 
surrogate for marginal cost. 
9 The Areeda and Turner rule is by their own admission under inclusive, as from a 
cost-based assessment, pricing below cost is an irrational economic strategy for a 
profit maximising firm, and therefore would rarely occur. 
A den1011stmted willi11g11ess to inr/11/ge i11 predatory pricing is unlikely to 
inhibit firms wit/, reso11rces colllparable to those of the predator. Repeated 
N 1, above . 
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predatio11 i11 tl,e same market, moreover, is not only costly but is likely to be 
casi ly detectable and thus the occasion for severe antitrust sanctions. The 
prospects of an adequate future payo.ff, therefore, will seldom be siifflcient to 
11wti1)(1te predation.
1 
Proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely 
4 rare. 
10 Advocates of cost-based tests consider that as their tests offer objective proof of 
predation, the satisfaction of the test should be conclusive evidence of predatory 
conduct, and any further inquiry is unnecessary: 
T/,e 11w1wpolist who sets or wts prices below short-run profit-nzaxilllising 
levels 11ecessarily contemplates t/,at the low price will have an "exclusionary" 
effect. 
11 However, the most obvious criticism of the claimed objectivity of cost-based tests 
is that they are wholly dependent on the variables chosen, 5 as well as the 
assumptions on which they are based.1' 
Di.ffere11t results can be achieved depending upon whether a static or lo11g run 
111odcl is exa111ined, or whether costs such as depreciatio11 are included. 
Tl,ere are real d{ff,culties in classifyi11g a cost as fixed or variable. Should 
the test elllbrace only a si11gle product in a multiple productfirn1? As more 
a11d /1/0refactors are introduced any test is rwdered meaningless. 
It has also been argued that predatory pnc111g to drive out rivals is unlikely because the alternabves 
of acquinng rivals by merger or fornung a price cartel are less costly. Sec McGee, Predatory Price 
Curtin,s;: The Standard Oil (N.].) Case, 1 J. L. & Econ. 137, 138-43 (1958); Telser, Cutthroat 
Competition and the Lon,s; Purse, 9 J. L. & Econ. 259 (1966). In the early years of the Sherman Act 
predatory pricing was used to coerce rivals into merger with the predator or into joining a price 
cartel. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910); United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Ne/I/ours & Co., 188 F. 127, 140 (Cir. Ct. Del. 1911). When these alternabves are also illegal and 
either more visible or more difficult to effect, however, the argument that they will supplant 
predatory pricing 1s unpersuasive. 
See Koller, The Myth of Predatory Prici11,iz - An E/1/pirical Study, 4 Anti-Trust L. & Econ. Rev. 105 
(Sunrn1er 1971) . 
Wear, M Predatory Pricin,iz and the Port Nelson Sala (1995) Victoria University Press, Wellington 15. 
Contrary to these claims of objectivity, implicit in competition policy is a very particular view of 
political and social reality. As Curran notes: "The large modern state is a product of our prevailing 
liberal theory of free markets, private property and individual action and of laws such as the antitrust 
laws that legitimate these institutions and facilitate their operation in furtherance of the 'conunon 
good"': W J Curran. "On democracy and economics" (1988) 33 Antitrust B11/lcti11 753 at 755 . 
12 Moreover, cost based tests have been criticised by lawyers and economists as 
offering an artificial economic-legal hybrid. Economists argue that cost-based tests 
ignore the fundamental questions of the interaction between supply and demand; 
whilst lawyers argue that quantitative economic models fail to provide any 
appropriate legal standards. 
13 Moreover, it is also argued that successful predatory behaviour can occur without 
prices falling below any measure of cost and consequently, cost based tests are of 
little value in determining such behaviour. Cost-based tests fail to catch "strategic" 
pricing behaviour by dominant firms, such as charging permanently or temporarily 
charging above cost but less than profit maximising prices to deter entry, that may 
be harmful to consumer welfare in the long run.
7 
For example, in a situation of 
optimal capacity or limit pricing, the output at which the fim1 can operate most 
cost-efficiently is also the output which maximises profits. In this way, the 
optimally adapted fim1 can engage in successful predatory pricing without 
incurring losses. It is contended that the Areeda and Turner marginal cost test is 
only relevant in a situation of excess capacity which only occurs in the rare 
situation of a recession, when entry is already unlikely. 
14 Nevertheless, the US Courts have traditionally adopted a cost based approach to 
the assessment of predatory pricing, and the Areeda & Turner marginal cost rule 
has been the test most employed. Taperell, Vermeesch and Harland note that 
"despite the academic criticism, the Areeda-Tumer test has received qualified acceptance in 
A111erica1L Courts" .8 
The Recoupment Test 
15 Whilst the advocates of cost-based tests implicitly recognised that predatory pricing 
would be irrational unless the predator could recover the losses incurred during the 
period of predation, cost based tests did not explicitly incorporate the potential for 
recovery as a necessary element to prove predation. ... 
Predation in 011y 1/leani11gfi,l sense cannot exist unless there is a telllporary 
sacr[f,re of net revenues ill t/,e expectation of greater future gains. Predatory 
Austill, P I The /11111 of Predatory Prici11l si11ce A1atsushira, Conference Paper. 
TapereU, Vermeesch and Harland, Trade Practices 1111d Consu111er Protcctio11 (3rd ed), Butterworths, 
yclney, l 983, para 650. See, for example, Barry vllr(izl,t Corp II ITT Cri1111ell Corp 724 F 2d 227 
(1 983), and US P/1ilips Corp II Wi1u/111crc Corp 861 F 2d 695 (Fed Cir 1988). Intem11tio1111/ Air 
l11dustries Inc II A111crirn11 Excelsior Co, 5 l 7F 2d 7 14 (5th Cir 1975), C11/!fim1i11 Co111puter Products l11c 11 
IBM Corp, 613F 2d 727 (9th Cir 1979), Ho111111cl Co II Fero Corp, 659F 2d 340 (3d Cir 1981), and 
Nor/hem Tclcphoue Co 11 A111crirn11 Telcp/1011e 1111d Tclc,~mph Co, 651F 2d 76 (2d Cir 1981). 
pricillg would ,nake little econo,nic sense to a potential predator unless he 
/1 ad (1) greater financial staying power than his rivals, and (2) a very 
substalltial prospect that the losses he inC11rs in the predatory campaign will 
be exceeded by the profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed.'' 
The Chicago School View 
16 Shortly after the introduction of cost based tests came the recoupment theory, 
developed by the Chicago School of antitrust.
111 
An exam.inat.ion of the Chicago 
chool view, its application by the United States courts, and the criticisms levelled 
at that test, is set out below. The application of the Chicago School view to an 
analysis of predatory pricing by the Australian and New Zealand courts and 
competition law autho1ities is considered in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively below. 
17 The view of the Chicago School is that below cost pricing is so patently 
economically irrational that predatory pricing should not constitute an antitrust 
infringement without clear evidence of the possibility of recoupment of the losses 
sustained. 
18 
'" 
II 
Ally realistic theory of predation recognises that the predator as well as his 
victi111s will illrnr losses d1trillg the Jightillg, but such a theory supposes it 
111ay be a ratio1ial calC11!ationfor the predator to view the losses as an 
i1wcst111wt i11 future mo11opoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or i11 
future 1111dist1trbed profits (where rivals are to be discipli11ed). Thefuture 
flow c?fprofits, appropriately discou1Lted, 1111tst then exceed the presmt size ef 
the losses. 11 
The Chicago School argument is that predation is an investment in future 
monopoly profits. Accordingly, the success of any predatory pricing scheme is 
The predator must be large enough in the relevant market to be able to expand output in order to 
absorb the excess demand created by this reduction in price. 
This term is used co describe economic theones made prominent by acadenucs at the University of 
Chicago, notably George Stigler, Robert Bork (who was originally at Yale University), Richard 
Posner and Frank Easterbrook. Members of this school maintain that the free market will most 
effectively achieve the most efficient allocation of resources and that allocative efficiency should be 
the sole goal of competition law. Bork maintains that: "The law must be drawn to serve as a mesh 
that stops oucput-restrictmg behaviour and perm.its efficiency creating activity ... The whole task of 
antitrust can be sununed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing 
proclucnve efficiency so greatly as co produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare": 
Bork, '171c Antitrust Paradox: A Policy al War 111ith Itself (Basic Books, New York, 1978), pp.70, 91. 
Bork, The A11titrust Paradox, p 145. This passage was cited with approval by the United States 
Supreme Court in /vlntmshita: 106 S Ct 1348 (1986) at 1357; cf, FM Fisher, "Matsushita: Myth v 
Analysis 111 the Economics of Predation" (1988) 64 Chica,~o-Kc11/ Ln11, Rc11ic111 969. 
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dependent upon future gains (appropriately discounted) exceeding present losses. 12 
It is the unviability of this recoupment which leads the Chicago School to regard 
predatory pricing as extremely rare. The Chicago School argues that, assuming the 
predatory firm has a larger market share than the victim, predation will actually be 
more costly to the predator. Moreover, the predator's loss of market share when 
prices are raised post predation, and the new entry that is likely to occur when 
prices are raised, will further reduce the potential to recoup. Accordingly, unless 
the predator has considerable financial resources, or is able to inflict very 
disproportionate losses, predation will be irrational.
11 
19 The Chicago view also rejects the notion that predation in one market can be 
financed by cross subsidisation from another market, as assuming profit 
maximisation is occurring in all markets, no further price increase could occur. 
Moreover, even if the predator has the resources available to finance predation, 
those funds could likely be used more profitably in alternative endeavours. 
20 Moreover, The Chicago School argues that the counterstrateg.ies available to the 
victim also serve to lessen the potential for successful predation. For exam.ple, the 
victim could offer long-term contracts at the competitive price, or acquire capital 
market finance to fund a defensive campaign. 
21 The recoupment test for predatory pricing does not abandon the necessity for 
examining the relationship between price and cost. However, that test is 
subjugated to the preliminary and fundamental question of whether recoupment is 
feasible. According to Easterbrook: 
22 
I.I 
Areedn a11d T11mer do ,wt explain why predatio11 ever is profitable; illdeed, 
nltl1011gh tl,ey specify certain "preconditiolls" to prcifitahle predntioll (quick 
exit a1Ld barriers to wtry tlwt protect the em11ing 11w1wpoly), their proposed 
rule does ,wt incorporate these preconditio1Ls. 
As with the cost based tests, advocates of the recoupment test consider that as their 
test offers objective proof of the ability to predate. Accordingly, if recoupment is 
impossible, then any inquiry, including an inquiry as to purpose, is irrelevant. As 
Easterbrook J stated in Rose Acre Farl/ls: "UHless reco1~p111ent lies in store even the most 
vicious i11fwt is /1ar111less to the co1llpetitive syste111". 
While the niaJority of predatory pricing cases have proceeded under the monopolisation offence of 
s2 of the Shcr111a11 Act, some cases have proceeded under the "attempt to monopolise" limb of s2. 
Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, p 147 . 
23 To support their claims of the rarity of such schemes, Bork and Posner both rely 
on studies by McGee which question whether Standard Oil was ever engaged in 
predatory pricing to drive out competing refineries. 14 If predatory pricing is a 
profitable venture the funds will be found regardless of the firm's dominance of 
other markecs. 1; 
24 Critics of The Chicago School recoupment approach comment that while the 
recoupment approach has the appeal of simplicity over artificial cost-based tests, 
and the evidentiary problems associated with purpose tests. However, as with cost 
based tests, the seeming reliance on a pure economic test, in fact, obscures the 
policy decision to prefer assumptions based on a particular economic theory . 
25 Critics of the Chicago view, such as Posner, also argue that whilst the difficulty of 
recoupment makes predatory pricing schemes rare, such pricing is not inevitably 
irrational (Posner). The Chicago School view is based on the assum.ption that 
firms prefer short-term profit-maximisation over longer-tem1 growth. However, 
this assumption ignores the fact that firms will take into account how their 
behaviour will affect the behaviour and expectations of existing and potential 
competitors. In fact, there are two clear methods by which predatory strategies 
can be profitable. First, a firm can develop a reputation for market toughness. 
26 Posner argues that a firm may: 
develop a reputation (for willi1Lgness to use predatory pricing) that may 
wable the fim1 to exclude other potwtial co111petitors without any additio1Lal 
below cost selling ... the costs illwrred ... ill one 111arket 111ay generate greater 
deterrence bwef,ts ill other markets. 
27 Similarly, although predatory pricing may not be profitable in the context of a 
single entrant, it may be so in the long run by the effect it has on other existing 
and potential rivals. 
I I 
I I 
J S McGee, "Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (NJ) Case" (1958) 1 J Law & Economics 
137: see St1111dard Oil Co 11 United States 21 US 1 (1911); cf, R Koller, "The Myth of Predatory 
Pricmg: An Empirical Study" (1971) 4 A11titrust Law & Eco110111ic Review 105. 
B Johns, "Identifying Predatory Conduct: The Role of Economic Evidence", paper presented at 
the Trade Practices and Co11su111cr Law Co1ifcrc11cc, Terrigal, October 1990. The issue here is essentially 
one of leverage: the use of monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in 
another: cf, US 11 Cr!ffitl, 334 US 100 (1948). But there are problems with this approach and 
certainly the mere accessibility of finance from monopoly profits is not sufficient co establish 
leverage; cf, the approach, however, in Victorian Egg Mnrkcti11,<z Board v Pnrkwood Egizs Pty Ltd (1978) 
A TPR 40-081. 
Tl1e ori,~i1ial handful of predatory episodes ,nay be costly to the predator, but 
that fir111 makes up its losses and //lore by intimidating other competitors ill 
the 11Ja11y lllarkets in which no predation has occurred (Posner). 
28 The second strategic approach would involve a multimarket predator adopting low 
prices in one market, so deterring entry into that or any other m.arket as potential 
rivals assume that the predator must be more efficient. 
29 Nevertheless, recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court US cases have 
adopted the recoupment test in preference to cost-based tests. In MatsHshita Electric 
Industrial Co Ltd II Zwith Radio Corp1 r, the United States Supreme Court appears to 
endorse completely the Chicago approach. 
30 In Matsushita two United States television manufacturers alleged that 21 Japanese 
television manufacturers had conspired to charge high prices for televisions in 
Japan and to use the profits from. these sales to subsidise low prices in the United 
States, with the objective of monopolising the United States market. 
31 The Supreme Court questioned the frequency of such schemes because: 
"conspirators ll/Ust ha11e a reaso11able expectation of recovery, ill the form ef later 
monopoly profits, more tha11 the losses s11fered" .17 
32 The Supreme Court regarded the success of such schemes as: 
"i11herwtly 1t11certain: the short-n11i loss is definite, bHt the lo11g-nm gaill depends 011 
sucresifully 11eutralising the coll/petition" .18 
33 The Court concluded that predatory pricing would be an irrational activity as there 
were no real barriers to entry in the market and, therefore, no likelihood of 
recoupment. 
1/, 
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106 S Ct 1348 (1986). This decision together with Ca(!Zi// Inc v Mo1iforl of Colorado Inc 479 US l04 
(1986) which adopted the approach in l\ lats11s/1ita, were the first US Supreme Court predatory 
pricmg cases smce Uta/1 Pie Co II Continental Baking Co 386 US 685 (1967). The Mats11shita decision 
h.ts been applied by che Court of Appeals in Indiana Grocery Inc II Super Value Stores foe 864 F 2d 
1409 (7th Cir 1989) and AA Po11ltry Far111s Jue II Rose Acre Far111s Jue 57 ATRR 260 (7th Cir 1989). 
106 S Cc 1348 ( l 986) at 1357, citing Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, p 145. 
Ibid. The Court cites Areeda and Turner together with Chicago School members Bork, 
Easterbrook, Koller and McGee on the rarity of such conduct. 
• 
34 Moreover, the Court also rejected the claim that the Japanese were using their 
supra-competitive profits in the Japanese market to sustain the substantial losses in 
the United States, '')without any examination of the evidence pertaining to purpose 
- which seems to be a complete acceptance of the Chicago School view that 
predatory behaviour by cross-subsidisation between markets is unlikely to occur. 
The Relevance of Purpose 
35 It is clear from the above analysis that in America evidence of purpose has received 
little emphasis in the establishm.ent of whether predatory pricing has occurred 
under both the cost-based and recoupment tests. The emphasis in the 
development of the predatory pricing doctrine has been in attempts to establish 
quasi-scientific standards to determine conclusively the existence of predatory 
pricing, with little focus on purpose. 
36 The assumption has been that, as all competitive conduct is ultimately intended to 
exclude competitors, proof of subjective intent does not assist in distinguishing 
predatory conduct. For example, Easterbrook J, in AA Poultry Farllls Inc v Rose 
Acre Far/1/s Inc, stated: 
37 
,., 
Intwt does llOt help to separate competition from attempted mo11opolisation ... 
il!twt is ,wt a basis of liauility (or a grou1Zd for inferring the existence if such a 
basis) ii! a predatory pricillg case. 2" 
This can be contrasted with the prominence of the inquiry as to purpose over a 
cost-based or recoupment analysis in both Australia and New Zealand, which is 
discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4 below . 
106 S Ct 1348 (1986) at 1359. 
Ibid, at 263. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
1 Like New Zealand, Australia has never, either by statute, or at conu11on law, 
explicitly or implicitly adopted the American doctrine of predatory pricing. 
2 There have been a number of Australian cases in which the doct1ine of predatory 
pricing has been specifically pleaded or considered. These cases demonstrate clear 
judicial reluctance to incorporate any of the Ame1ican tests, or even any particular 
element of those tests, into an assessment of whether predatory pricing has 
occurred; preferring instead to concentrate solely on the wording of the Trade 
Practices Act 197 4 itself A sim.ilar attitude on the part of the Trade Practices 
Conmussion, the agency responsible for enforcing the Trade Practices Act is 
demonstrated by its investigation into the collapse of Compass Airlines, which can 
be contrasted with the divergence of approach between the New Zealand courts 
and the New Zealand Conm1erce Conu1ussion exanuned in Chapter 4 of this 
paper. The courts' and the Conmussion's decisions are analysed in detail below. 
The Trade Practices Act 1974 
3 Australia's prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour are contained in the Trade 
Practices Act 197 4. The provision of the Act which is relevant to an assessment of 
predatory pricing is section 46 which prohibits use of market power for proscribed 
anti-competitive purposes. 
AUSTRALIAN PREDATORY PRICING CASES 
..J. The Australian decisions to date considering allegations of predatory pricing in 
terms of section 46 of the Trade Practices Act are exanuned below. 
The Tytel case 
5 In one of the earliest decisions on predatory pricing under section 46, the Tyte/21 
case, the Australian Telecommunications Conmussion (ATC) introduced a new 
telephone into the Australian market. The price for the telephone did not include 
the surcharge usually imposed by the A TC to elinunate its competitive advantage 
" Tytcl Pty Ltd 11 Austmlinn Tclcco111111u11icntio11s Co111111issio11 (1978) ATPR 40-081; (1978) 33 FLR 294; 
(1978) 4TPC 124. 
due to its being exempt from customs duty. The surcharge was later included in 
the price, but the product was still relatively cheaper than its competitor. Jackson J 
did not consider the latter price which reflected A TC's costs and included the 
surcharge to be predatory. However, he was less certain about the introductory 
p1ice and said that the evidence was: 
. .. ope11 to the i11terpretatio1L that the respondent used its power in the market to set a 
low price for the Versatel for its introduction to the market for premium telephones, 
and did so for the p14rpose of s11bsta1Ltially da 11iaging the .. . applica1Lts in terms of 
sectioll 46(1)(a), or for the purpose of deterring thelll from engaging in COlllpetitive 
conduct in tlwt //larket in terllls of section 46(1}(h), or for the purpose of deterring 
the1n fro111 engaging in COlllpetitive COl!duct i11 that market in terllls of section 46(1)(c). 
6 The Tytel case clearly rejected the Areeda & Turner view that prices nmst be 
below average variable cost to be predatory and endorsed the view posited by 
critics of cost-based tests that successful strategic predatory pricing can occur 
notwithstanding the fact that the predator's prices are not below its own costs; 
although it was not made clear whether they would need to undercut the 
competitor's price. 
The Victorian Egg Marketing Board Case 
7 Similarly, in the Victorian Egg Marketing Boari2 case, the only case in which a claim 
of predatory pricing under section 46 succeeded, the necessity for price to full 
below the Areeda & Turner b1ightline test of average variable cost before an 
allegation of predatory pricing could be sustained was rejected. 
" 
I leave opw the q11estio1L whether in the ordi11ary co11rse a 11wnopolist call rngage in 
predatory price-C11tti11g 011ly if the price is below sol/le partirnlar cost, a1Ld 11ot where the 
price set, altho11gh it I/lay deter colllpetitors, is o/le which //lerely does 1wt maximise t/1e 
11101wpolist's profit. It I/lay be that where 011e can i,ifer the requisite purpose from 
other evidence, price-wtti11g 11iay be predatory i11 the swse referred to and a 'taki11g 
adva1Ltage' of power derived fro 111 the substantial control of a market, notwithstanding 
that it is 1wt below 111arginal or average variable cost a11d does not res11lt in loss being 
i /!Cl/ rred. 
21 
ictorin11 Egg Mnr/.:cti11.iz Board II Par/.:wood Eges Pty Ltd (1978) ATPR 40-081. 
Ibid . 
8 However, the court was prepared to focus on whether elements of the American 
tests could be useful indicators of predation and concluded that the Areeda & 
Turner test could be helpful in this regard. 
where a w1poratio11 with the requisite market power is, in the absence of countervailing 
evirlc11ce that its prici11g was ,wt aimed at destroyi,ig actual or potential competition, 
selling at below average variable cost there may be grounds for iriferring that it is taki,ig 
arlva11tagc of its power for a proscribed purpose. 
9 In addition, the court applied United States authority24 to the effect that predatory 
pricing is indicated by the use of temporary price reductions. 
10 On the facts in this case Bowen CJ concluded that the Victorian Egg Marketing 
Board did have predatory purpose in temporarily pricing in the Australian Capital 
Territories (ACT) market at a price well below that which it charged in Victoria 
(its usual market), and which its competitor in the ACT, Parkwood, was not able 
to meet without making a loss, notwithstanding that it had not been established 
that the predator's prices were not below any measure of cost. 
11 However, the Tytel and Victoria// Egg Marketi,ig Board decisions must be contrasted 
with the more recent precedents under section 46, which evince, in comm.on with 
the American courts, a clear Australian judicial reluctance to regard price 
reductions as raising any inference of anti-competitive purpose in the absence of 
compelling evidence of predatory intent. That more recent Australian attitude is 
exemplified by the decisions in the CSBP & Farmers and Eastern Express cases, 
which are analysed below. 
The CSBP Case 
12 In the CSBJY; case it was made clear that a price reduction by a market dominant 
firm, even if timed to coincide with and undercut a price reduction by a 
competitor, would not raise any inference of predatory conduct. On the facts in 
this case, CSBP reduced its price per tonne for urea to undercut the sale prices 
simultaneously announced by a competitor. 
13 In that case, Fisher J went on to state that if an "unreasonably low" p1ice had been 
charged, with the intent of keeping a competitor out, that could be an indicator of 
predatory intent. However, it was not made clear whether an unreasonably low 
US,, Com Produc/s Rcfi11i11<11. Co. (1966) 234 F. 964 at pp. 1012-1013. 
Trade Practices Co111111issio11 11 CSBP F11r111crs Ltd (1980) ATPR 40-151. 
price signified a price below some measure of cost. In this case liability was 
avoided as there was no evidence of below cost pricing; and in Fisher J's view, the 
price reduction represented legitimate business behaviour - that is, there was no 
prima facie evidence of any proscribed purpose. 
it can/lot be that an adjustmwt [by a corporation with a substantial degree of market 
power] of its price which only refl.ects, e.g., a change in cost <if materials is a 
co11traventioll of the Act if the adjustment injures another ... I would see this as 
predatory behaviour if it be proved that the defendant charged an unreasonably low 
price wit/1 the intent to keep [a co111petitor out <if the market). 
14 The CSBP case appears to adopt the American presumption, which was later 
reiterated by Wilcox J in the Eastern Express case that if prices are not below cost, 
the plaintiff must prove predatory intent. 
The Eastern Express Case 
15 In the Eastern Express2" case it was alleged that General Newspapers had engaged in 
predatory pricing in reducing the price for display advertising in its newspaper, for 
the purpose of elim.inating or damaging Eastern Express. General Newspapers 
conceded that its price cuts would adversely affect Eastern Express; however it 
claimed that these price cuts were necessary to defend its publication. 
16 Following the widely accepted American view,
27 
Wilcox] rejected the notion that 
price reductions by a firm having market power would give rise to a presumption 
of proscribed purpose. 
~,. 
" 
Traders co11111101Zlyfix prices wit/, the intention <if diverti11g to thelllselves custom which 
would ot/1er111ise flow to their competitors. In doing so, they realise that, if they are 
succcs!Jitl, t/1e result will be to da111age - ill extreme cases, evw to eli111inate - those 
ro111petitors. But such co11duct is the very st1iff <if competitioll, the rernlt which Pt IV 
seeks to achieve. It would be surprisillg if Parliall!ent i11twded to proscribe competitive 
co11duct w/1e11 undertaken by a co111pa11y wit/, stefficiwt resources to colllpete effectively. 
S0111ethi11g I/lore 11rnst be req11ired ... n 
Eastcm Express Pty Ltd 11 Cc11crnl Nc111spapcrs Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-128. 
See for example Oly111pin Equip111c11t Lcasi11x Co. v Wcstcm U11io11 Tclcxrc1ph Co., 797 F. 2d 370 (7th 
C1t 1986). 
At 52,897. 
17 In Wilcox J's view, the means for distinguishing between legitimate price 
reductions and anti-competitive predatory pricing would be provided by an 
. . 2•; 
exanunat10n as to purpose: 
... t/,c outward 1/lanifestation of a decision to engage in predatory pricing is a lowering 
of prices, a11 action which, on its face, is procolllpetitive. The factor which turns mere 
price wtti11g i11to predatory pricing is t/,e purpose for which it is undertakw ... 
J 8 Whilst the American tests for predation largely ignore the issue of purpose; Wilcox 
J nevertheless considered that elements of those tests could be synthesised to 
provide guidance as to the existence of predatory purpose and concluded that 
failure to meet a cost standard would be one element necessary to the finding of a 
proscribed purpose. 
I t/,i11k that t/,e principles evolved i11 Arnerica provide useful guida11ce upon the 
problelll of applying the co11cept of predatory pricing to s 46. lf they make one thing 
clear, it is t/,at a cha,ge of predatory prici11g 1111-1st be related to t/,e costs incurred by the 
, :\O 
pnrc rn tter. 
19 Wilcox J then went on to consider United States authorities in more detail in an 
attempt to determine whether a set of conclusive indicators of predatory pricing 
could be derived. His Honour then adopted the following factors as appropriate 
indicators of predation, although he did not express a final view as to whether they 
should be regarded as conclusive:" 
.!'J 
II 
• below cost pricing is a necessary prerequisite, and the most appropriate cost 
measure is average variable cost. 
• the essence of predatory pricing is its "sporadic" temporary element. 
• the critical question is the purpose behind below cost pricing and the 
determination of purpose should employ a two stage inquiry . If prices are 
below average total cost but above average variable cost, the plaintiff bears 
the burden of proving predatory purpose; if prices are below average variable 
cost, the defendant must prove a lack of predatory purpose . 
At 52, 895. 
Above nlO, 900. 
At pp 52,898-52,900. 
• 
20 Notably, Wilcox J did not require the potential for recoupment as a necessary 
element of a predatory pricing claim. Wilcox J's approach in synthesising relevant 
elements of the American tests into a framework for indicating predatory conduct, 
but not including the necessity for recoupment within that set, was mirrored by 
McGechanJ in the High Court of New Zealand in the Port Nelson case, which is 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this paper. 
21 However on appeal, the Full Federal Court expressed a clear reluctance to define 
and apply any particular set of rules on this issue. This reluctance likely stems from. 
the continued debate over what constitutes predatory pricing and how to detect 
. _n 
lt. 
22 The Full Federal Court commented that the United States contexts in which 
predatory pricing occurred varied widely and often were not analogous to 
Australian trade practices law. Whilst it was not apparent that Wilcox J had 
intended directly to incorporate the United States doctrine of predatory pricing 
into Australian law, Lockhart and Gummow JJ nevertheless specifically warned 
against the direct application of Ame1ican predatory pricing decisions to section 46 
cases. 
23 
It would be ... (11! error to translate illto tl,e operatioll of s46 the United States 
decisio11s dealillg with predatory pricing at tl,e expense if an indepwdent exa111ination 
of the A11straliall legislatiol! as it applies to eacl, case. 
o preord(1i11ed and fixed categon·es as to the level if pricing or eco,w,nic theory or 
practice if costillg necess(lrily control the drawi11g of that i1iferwce i11 any partiwlar 
wse. 
The Full Federal Court clearly rejected adopting any specific set of criteria to 
provide indicators of the existence of predatory p1icing in tenns of section 46, 
preferring instead a total rule of reason approach based purely on an analysis of the 
dominant firm's purpose. The Full Federal Court's approach was expressly 
approved by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the Port Nelson case, which is 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this paper. 
See Trade Practices Conunission, "Misuse of Market Power Background Paper" (TPC, Canberra, 
1990), paras 55-64 and Report of the Trade Practices Comrn.ission, The Failure ,if Co111pass Airlines 
(TP , Canberra, 1992). See also Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines adopted by Canada's 
Director of lnvesugation and Research (1992) 62 Antitrust and Trade Re<~ulatio11s Report Special 
Supplement. 
24 The observation which can be made is that in failing to provide any analytical 
framework for assessing the elements necessary to prove predatory pricing, the 
Australian Full Federal Court has failed to establish any transparent test by which a 
plaintiff can attempt to distinguish predatory conduct from competitive behaviour; 
thus rendering allegations of predatory pricing less likely to succeed. 
25 However, as the Full Federal Court's ideological position appears to concur with 
that underlying American auth01ities, that is, that predatory pricing is inherently 
irrational and unlikely to occur, the active discouragement of predatory pricing 
claims may have been intentional. 
. .. The Court should be vigilant to ensure that its j1uisdiction is not invoked to 
i11teifere wit/, normal and legitimate competiti1Je pricing activities in the relevant market 
111Zder the guise that such activities are predatory. 33 
THE APPROACH OF THE AUSTRALIAN TRADE PRACTICES 
COMMISSION 
26 A sim.ilar ideological view on the part of the Australian Trade Practices 
Commission is evident from its investigation into the collapse of Compass Airlines, 
which is analysed below. 
27 From this decision it is clear that the Trade Practices Commission evinces a similar 
reluctance to the Australian courts to define particular criteria as conclusive 
indicators of predatory intent. Although, in contrast to decisions by the Australian 
judicial t1ibunals, but in common with the New Zealand Corn.merce Commission, 
the Trade Practices Conmussion does appear to favour the Chicago school 
recoupment approach to the assessment of predation, it in fact failed to apply that 
theory in its reasoning in this decision. 
The Trade Practices Commission's Inquiry into the Collapse of Compass 
Airlines 
28 In 1992 the Trade Practices Conmussion carried out an investigation into the 
collapse of Compass Airlines. 
29 Compass Airlines had been a new entrant into the Australian domestic passenger 
aviation market. Following Compass' entry and its strategy of significant fare 
II 
(l992) 106 ALR 297,324,326. 
discounting, the two incumbent carriers retaliated by offering substantial discounts, 
particularly in the form of travel bonuses and frequent flier programmes. 
30 The Trade Practices Com .. mission considered whether cost based tests could be 
relevant indicators of predatory intent and, whilst it did not regard such tests as 
conclusive, it accepted that: 14 
pricing below average variable cost is difficult to justify Oil commercial grmmds and //lay 
tl,erefore be illdicative of predatory i11tent. 
3 l The Corn.m.ission went on to apply this cost test and concluded that, as prices were 
not below average variable cost, they were not predatory, notwithstanding that: 
all t/1ree airli11es werefaili11g to cover their overheads and were recordillg losses overall 
in 1991 . This illdicates tl,at the level of price competition on Compass' routes was 
not sustainable ill the 111edi11m ter,11 for ally of them. 
32 The reason for the Conmlission's failure to clarify why these below cost prices 
were not predatory , or to conduct any inquiry as to purpose, appears to because 
the Commission supports the Chicago school recoupment approach to an 
assessment of predation. On the facts here the Conmlission concluded that since 
Compass' failure there had been no significant increase in fares, and therefore, as 
recoupment had not occurred the price reductions had not been predatory. 
33 However, the Comnlission's assessment seems to have been a nlisapplication of the 
recoupment test. The relevant consideration is whether there is an ability to 
recoup, and it is clear that the Conu1lission had earlier concluded that the high 
barriers to entry to the domestic passenger aviation market did make recoupment 
feasible. 
\.I 
At the same time the TPC also recognised that in certain circumstances (such as the need to avoid 
redundancies, or to clear excess stocks of perishable goods and services), even pricing below average 
variable cost could be jmtified and consistent with competitive behav10r. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE NEW ZEALAND APPROACH 
INTRODUCTION 
In common with Australia, New Zealand has never, either by statute, at conm1on 
law, explicitly adopted the American doctrine of predatory pricing. '; 
2 Historically, and in contrast to the United States and Australia, there have been 
very few New Zealand cases in which the doctrine has been specifically pleaded or 
considered. Nevertheless, a notable recent decision reiterates New Zealand 
appellate judicial reluctance to incorporate any of the American tests, or even any 
particular elements of those tests, into an assessment of whether predatory pricing 
has occurred; preferring instead to concentrate solely on the wording qf the 
Conm1erce Act 1986 itself. 
3 Conversely, recent decisions by the Commerce Commission, the agency 
responsible for enforcing the Conm1erce Act, illustrate that the Conu11ission clearly 
favours the Chicago School recoupment test as the most appropriate means to 
establish predation; and considers that American authority can provide useful 
precedent on the elements necessary to prove the existence of predatory pricing. 
The courts' and the Conmussion's decisions are analysed in detail below. 
The Commerce Act 1986 
4 New Zealand's prohibitions on anti-competitive behaviour are contained in the 
Conm1erce Act 1986. The provisions of the Act which are relevant to an 
assessment of predatory pricing are sections 36 and 27. 
5 Section 36 of the Act nurrors section 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 197 4 
and specifically prohibits the use of a donunant position in a market for the 
purpose of preventing or deterring competition or restricting the entry of any 
person, or eliminating any person; from any market. 
Tim can be comrasted with the US essennal facilities doctrine which was expressly adopted 
by the High Court of New Zealand in tl,c Auckland R((.!io11al Authority v Mutual Rental Cars 
(Auckland Airport) Li111itcd [1987) 2 NZLR 647. However, the New Zealand courts are now 
also more reluctant to apply that doctrine. See for example, Fisher & Pnykcl v Co111111crcc 
Co1111111ssio11 (1990) 3 NZBLC at 101,678. 
6 Section 27 of the Act prohibits a person from entering into, or giving effect to, a 
contract, arrangement or understanding which contains a provision which has the 
purpose or effect (or likely effect) of substantially lessening competition in a 
market. 
New Zealand predatory pricing cases 
7 There has only been one judicial decision to date considering an allegation of 
predatory pricing in terrn.s of the Conm1erce Act, the recent Port Nelson case. This 
case is examined below. 
The Port Nelson Case 
8 In the Port Nelson case, Port Nelson was the dominant provider of all port facilities 
at Nelson port. Port Nelson refused to allow a new entrant, Tasman Bay Marine 
Pilots Ltd ("TBMPL") to use its own pilots when hiring Port Nelson's tugboats, 
but required TBMPL to use Port Nelson's pilots, the so-called "tug tie". 
9 In addition, the port company introduced a minimum charge and discount. The 
Conm1erce Conmussion brought proceedings against Port Nelson alleging that the 
tug tie and the discount structure breached sections 36 and 27 of the Co1m11erce 
Act. The Comnussion's central allegation in relation to predatory conduct was 
that Port Nelson's discount structure amounted to below cost predatory pricing for 
the purposes of elinunating TBMPL as a competitor, and was an anti-competitive 
use of donunance for a proscribed purpose in breach of section 36 of the Act. 
10 Notably, the Commission did not specifically allege that this predatory pricing 
structure breached section 27 of the Act (which does not relate to use of market 
power), as the Conu11ission supports the Chicago School view that predatory 
pricing is only feasible for a firm having market power. This issue is discussed 
further below in the context of the Comnussion's investigation into Internet 
pricing and the collapse ofl(jwi Airlines. 
11 The High Court and the Court of Appeal analysed Port Nelson's conduct under 
section 36 to deternune whether its new pricing structure reflected an anti-
competitive use of donunance. In considering this issue, rather than conducting 
any analysis of Port Nelson's pricing structure and behaviour in tem1s of any of the 
elements of the American tests for predatory pricing, both the inferior and superior 
courts chose instead sim.ply to apply the precedent for use of dominance laid down 
by the Privy Council in the Teleco111 v Clear local access case. 3<, 
J 2 That test is that a dominant firm will only incur liability under section 36 for its 
unilateral conduct if it acts in a way which a person not in a dominant position, 
but otherwise in the same circumstances, would have acted. If there is an anti-
competitive use of dominance, a proscribed purpose can generally be presumed, 
but not the converse. 37 
13 However, the Telecom v Clear local access case was not a decision on predatory 
pricing, but rather related to the maximum. price, that is, its opportunity cost; that 
a vertically integrated natural monopoly can charge for access to, in this case, its 
telecommunications network. The only direct relevance of the local access case to 
a decision on predatory pricing, is that it is clear that monopolistic pricing practices 
arc not per se prohibited under section 36 of the Commerce Act. Apart from. that 
aspect, the Teleco111 v Clear case provides little useful guidance on the application of 
section 36 to a claim of predatory pricing. 
1-1- In applying the Teleco111 v Clear test both the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
quickly concluded that introducing the minimum charge and discount did not 
amount to a use of Port Nelson's dominance, as it was not acting in a way in 
which it would not have acted had it not been dominant. 
15 However, neither tribunal provided any clear indication of the circumstances, if 
any, in which price reductions by a market dominant firm would amount to a use 
of dominance or evidence anti-competitive purpose in tem1s of section 36. 
Moreover, as the Teleco111 v Clear test has subjugated the inquiry as to purpose to 
that of use of dominance; a test which appears almost impossible to satisfy, it seems 
likely that even compelling evidence of predatory purpose will not be sufficient to 
attract liability for predatory pricing under section 36. 
l6 Nor did either tribunal consider the more pertinent question of whether Port 
Nelson was acting in a way in which it co11/rf not have acted had it not been 
dominant, for example by financing the discount through cross-subsidisation; 
which appears to be an implicit acceptance of the Bork view that such leveraging is 
17 
Tclcco111 Corporntio11 of Nc111 Zcala11d Ltd II Clear Co111111u11icatio11s Ltd [1955] 1 NZLR 385. 
If a dommant firm engages in collusion, it may infringe the restrictive trade practices 
prohibitions in Part l l of the Conunerce Acc. 
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unlikely to occur. However, McGechan J suggested that a tying arrangement 
could be one indicator of anti-competitive predatory behaviour. 
17 The lack of effective analysis of Port Nelson's pricing strategy under section 36 
may well be a manifestation of the New Zealand courts' ideological position, 
shared with that of American and Australian judicial tribunals, that predatory 
pricing by a market dominant firm. is inherently economically irrational and 
unlikely to occur; accompanied by a marked reluctance to regard low prices as 
potentially damaging to consumer welfare. 
18 For example, in the High Court, McGechan J reflected the prevailing attitude of 
the American courts, and also that expressed by Wilcox J in the Eastem Express 
case, that no presumption of predation would be raised by a dominant firm 
lowering its prices . 
. . . there see111s no reason why a monopolist should not be able to give discounts, in 
accorda11ce with normal practice, like any other trader. Indeed, it is to the benefit ef 
co11rn1ners, a11d wcourages efficiency on the part of the monopolist, to do so. In 
partiwlar, in relation to bulk discounts within t/ze monopoly lines, or discounts for 
pro111pt pay111wt, it is diffirnlt to see /,ow such ever could be harniful. 
19 As both courts concluded that Port Nelson's pricing structure did not am.aunt to a 
use of its dominance in terms of section 36, both courts then turned to analyse 
whether predatory behaviour could be said to have occurred in terms of section 27 
of the Commerce Act. In analysing predatory pricing under section 27, which 
does not require market dominance, both courts seemingly rejected the Chicago 
school view preferred by the Conm1erce Commission that predatory pricing is 
only possible for a firm having market power. However, as illustrated below, it is 
clear from their analysis of the elements required to prove an allegation of 
predatory conduct in breach of section 27, that market power is an implicit 
element of the offence. 
20 McGechan J in the High Court considered the relationship between price and 
cost, and adopted the traditional American view that for prices to breach section 
27, the defendant's overall pricing structure must be below cost. 
... it is ,wt breac/, ef s27 si111ply to price co111petitively. Ajirni wl,icl, through 
efficiency, or willi11gness to co11tai11 profit lllargins, rmderwts rivals or potential entra11ts 
11111y /,ave tl,e eli111i11ation of competition ns 011e of its purpose . ... Such efflciwcies a11d 
prcifit contai11111ent 11evertl,eless nre regarded as in the public i11terest. S11cl, scenarios 
• 
are co11ipetition in action; to be promoted by the Act, not prevented by it. lf less 
efflriellt or I/lore rapacious co111petitors are killed off, so be it. 
For breach of s27 to ocwr, pricing must go rather further. Pricing must be below cost. 
(We leave aside the theoretical complication of pricing at cost.) 
21 McGechan J then went on to conduct a minute examination of various cost 
thresholds and made considerable reference to the Areeda & Turner test of average 
variable cost, but ultimately did not chose any particular measure of costs as the 
appropriate test for New Zealand. 
22 Having established that Port Nelson's overall prices would be below any relevant 
measure of cost, McGechan J then went on to consider the other elements 
necessary to establish a breach of section 27. 
23 As it was clear that the discount had not had the effect of substantially lessening 
competition, McGechanJ had to establish whether there was an anti-competitive 
purpose. In analysing whether such a purpose existed, he read into the section an 
additional requirement of predation, that is an intent to create an aggressive 
deterrent reputation. 
24 
25 
The section will be ,net if the activity has the features cif prici11g below cost, with 
associated substantial purpose of eli111inating or deterri11g preswt co111petitio1L, and the 
rrcatioll of a deterrwt aggressive rep11tatio1L." 
This additional predatory requirement implies that market power is a prerequisite 
for the existence of predatory pricing, as only a firm having market power would 
be in a position to create such an aggressive deterrent reputation. This is clearly 
the view adopted by the Comrn.erce Commission in its investigation into Internet 
pricing, which is discussed below. 
McGechan J considered that the above elements would be sufficient to establish 
predatory p1icing in terms of section 27, and clearly rejected the Chicago school 
notion that recoupment is a necessary clement of the offence . 
'" 
. . . co1Lduct that does lessw col/lpetitioll will contravene [the section) even in the absence 
cf evidwce ef the ability 11/ti111ately to recoup t/1e loss - though that may generally be 
prcsul/led from a decision to indulge ill anti-colllpetitive cond11ct ... 
Above, .it p.538 . 
26 McGechan J's conclusion that below cost pricing accompanied by anti-competitive 
purpose and the creation of a deterrent aggressive reputation is sufficient to 
establish predatory pricing, appears to be a clear endorsement of the Posner view 
that predatory strategies can be rational without necessarily incorporating a clear 
ability to recoup. 
27 Nevertheless, whilst incorporating many elements of US analysis of predatory 
pricing into his assessment of whether a breach of section 27 had occurred, His 
Honour was at pains to point out that this did not mean that the doctrine of 
predatory pricing existed in New Zealand. 
It will be ,wticcd this discussion has not referred to ''predatory pricing 11 • That is 
deliberate. Nor does the legislation. The statutory question is whether the provision 
concerned has tl,e purpose (or effect or likely effect) of substa,itially lessening 
co111petitio11. if it does, the section is met. if it does not, tlzrn wlzetlzer or not the 
activity al/lounts to "predatory prici11gn - a term of uncertain scope - the section is not 
n 1et. 
28 Despite McGechan J's apparent disavowal of the existence of the doctrine of 
predatory pricing in New Zealand, the Court of Appeal were clearly critical of the 
emphasis he had placed on using the criteria applied in the United States to support 
his findings and warned against the incorporation of US-based case law into the 
wording of the Conm1erce Act. 
Like the Full Court of the Federal Court i11 Australia (Eastem Express Pty Ltd v 
Ge11eral Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) ATPR 41-167, 40,307) we are reluctant 
a11to11wtically to read into the statutory wording concepts evolved in the differently 
based United States case law. 
29 In particular, whilst upholding the High Court's decision, the Court of Appeal 
refused to accept that below cost charging was a prerequisite for a breach of section 
27; or even that it would raise any inference of predatory conduct. J'J 
,., 
It is ,wt a co11travrntio11 of s27 to offer or sell goods or services at less than cost. The 
sectio11 requires proof cf the substantial lesseni11g of competition - ,wt merely aggressive 
co111petitive conduct. . .. The 1/lere fact that a participant operates in t/,e lllarket at a 
loss ... will not necessarily lessen co111petition. 
Porl Nclso11 11 Co111111crcc Co111111issio11 (1996) CA, 169/95, 247 
• • 
Ill 
• 
(b)elow cost pricing will not frequently give rise to competition law co,icerns. The 
reducfioll of prices generally will reflect competition at work ... 
30 Accordingly, the criteria posited by McGechanJ in the High Court of below cost 
pricing accompanied by anti-competitive purpose and the creation of a deterrent 
aggressive reputation, can no longer be relied upon as conclusive indicators of 
predatory pricing. 
31 Moreover, it appears that the New Zealand courts are likely to remain reluctant to 
enunciate any clear criteria as indicative of such predatory conduct. However, in 
failing to provide any clear analytical framework for assessing the relevance of 
pricing behaviour - the Court failed to establish any clear test by which predatory 
conduct can be distinguished from com.petitive behaviour 
THE APPROACH OF THE NEW ZEALAND COMMERCE COMMISSION 
DECISIONS 
32 In contrast to the New Zealand judicial approach, the Commerce Commission has 
made it clear in two recent decisions that it continues strongly to favour the 
Chicago recoupment approach to an assessment of predatory pricing, and will have 
regard to and apply the United States tests, notwithstanding the explicit rejection 
of both of these approaches by the Court of Appeal. 
33 
34 
Commerce Commission Investigation of Internet Pricing 
In May 1997 the Commerce Conmi.ission published its report on its investigation 
into allegations of predatory pricing against Telecom New Zealand Limited in 
respect of its internet access business. 
In this case independent providers of internet services (ISPs) alleged that Telecom 
was engaging in predatory pricing by reducing its internet access price. The new 
prices were substantially below Telecom's previous prices, and those charged at the 
time by the ISPs. The ISPs alleged this meant that Telecom must be pricing its 
Internet access services below cost, particularly as Telecom's 0800 number access 
price to Telecom customers of $4. 95 per hour was clearly less than the price of 
approximately $6.00 per hour offered by Telecom to ISPs for access to the same 
service. 
35 In assessing whether predatory behaviour had occurred under section 36 of the 
Act, the Conunission followed the precedent laid down in the Port Nelson decision 
that price reductions by a dominant firm do not amount to use of dominance in 
terms of section 36. Once again, no view was expressed as to what other 
• • • 
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behavioural elements would also need to be present to lead to the conclusion that 
predatory pricing in terms of section 36 had occurred. 
36 Despite the explicit rejection of the recoupment approach by both the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal in Port Nelson, the Commission nevertheless applied this 
approach. It concluded that the low entry barriers to the internet market, and the 
fact that credible competition already existed in the internet n1arket - CLEAR was 
an established participant in the n1.arket and Telstra had signalled its intention to 
enter after Telecom had reduced its prices, rendered recoupment ultimately 
unfeasible. 
37 The Commission did also consider the issue of whether Telecom would be able to 
create an aggressive deterrent reputation by its conduct, seemingly accepting the 
Posner view as approved by McGechan J in the Port Nelson case, that a predatory 
pricing strategy can also be rational if it succeeds in discouraging entry to the 
relevant markets. However, the Commission's view appears to be that unless such 
strategic behaviour is also accompanied by an ultimate ability to recoup, then the 
test for predatory pricing is not satisfied. 
38 
39 
Further, the Conunission concluded that as there was a legitimate business reason 
for Telecom to price in that manner, namely to increase subscriber numbers to 
enable it ultimately to generate higher profits from the provision of value added 
services, no predatory purpose could be inferred.
40 
This aspect of the decision may 
be limited to industries where an economy of scope can be gained from the joint 
provision of two services. For example, media such as television, radio and 
newspapers are provided below cost in order to increase circulation. This in turn 
attracts a larger advertising revenue which makes the newspaper or magazine 
profitable overall. As advertising revenues are a function of circulation, the profit 
of a newspaper or a magazine is maximised not by raising the price and restricting 
the size of the readership, but rather by lowering the price so as to increase its 
circulation and advertising revenue. 
41 
Given its conclusion that recoupment was not feasible, the Commission did not 
carry out any analysis of whether Telecom's prices were below any measure of 
cost. However, whilst it is clear that the Conunission considers that prices below 
marginal cost are a necessary prerequisite to an allegation of predatory pricing (see 
'" 
" 
The Econom.ist had also predicted that competition in Internet provision would drive many 
internet service providers in this direction. The Economist, llltcmct Service Pro11idcrs: Maki11,1; 
a Busi11m oftlic Bit Bu_[fct, 8th March 1997, pp. 79-80. 
Areeda and Hovenbmp, paragraph 729.7a. 
the discussion of the Commission's investigation into the collapse of Kiwi Airlines 
below), it does not endorse the view that below cost pricing is sufficient to raise 
any presumption of predatory conduct, at least in an emerging market. In this 
regard, the Commission once again expressly approved United States authority, 
recognising that new entrants into a n1arket often make losses for substantial 
periods before they become established, as noted in the Rose Acre farms case." 
Tryi 11g to irifer (or refute) predatory conduct from the relation between price and cost is 
diffirnlt lmsiness. Oftw a price below cost reflects only the sacrifice necessary to 
esta/Jlisl, a presence in a colllpetitive market (for example, new magazines lose money 
for years as they try to increase circulation and attract advertising revenue, without 
creati11g t/1e ti11iest risk of monopoly). 
40 The Commission's investigation into internet pricing clearly evidences the 
Conmiission's endorsement of the Chicago school approach to an assessment of 
predatory pricing, and a clear preference for utilising the factors posited in 
American case law as indicators of whether predation can be assumed or not. The 
Conmiission's recent investigation into the collapse of Kiwi Airlines, which is 
exaniined below, further consolidates this approach. 
The Commerce Commission's Investigation into the Collapse of Kiwi Airlines 
41 In August 1997 the Commerce Comniission published its report into the 
investigation of alleged predatory behaviour by Air New Zealand in substantially 
lowering some of its prices for Trans-Tasman flights to match the fares charged by 
the new entrant, K..iwi Airlines. 
42 On the evidence produced by Kiwi Airlines, the Conmiission concluded that it 
was not established that Air New Zealand had doniinance in any relevant market, 
which, in the Comniission's view, automatically precluded any finding of 
predatory pricing. This again evidences the Comniission's endorsem.ent of the 
Chicago school approach; as only firms having doniinance would have the 
required ability to recoup. Notwithstanding, the Conunission went on to assess 
the allegations against Air N ew Zealand on the assumption that doniinance could 
b :l 4:\ e provec. 
43 Once again, in applying the Privy Council test for use of doniinance, the 
Conmiission was compell ed to conclude that Air N ew Zealand's behaviour did 
A A Poultry Far111s Inc v Rose Acre Fnr111s Inc 881 F.2d 1396 (7th Cir. 1989) at HOO. 
Above, 11 x, para 28 . 
not amount to use of dominance. On this occasion the Conmussion made it plain 
that it considered the Privy Council test in the Telecom v Clear case inappropriate to 
an assessment of whether predatory pricing has occurred in tem1s of section 36. 
alt/101t(!h helpful, t/1e Privy Council test for predatory prices is not very exacting. 
44 Accordingly, whilst recognising that the United States' tests for predatory pricing 
have not been adopted by New Zealand Courts, the Commission nevertheless 
described them as providing "instructive benefit" and, as with its investigation into 
internet pricing, went on to apply the criteria for establishing predatory pricing 
from what it considered to be the most appropriate American authorities. In this 
instance, the Commerce Comnussion adopted Judge Easterbrook's test in the Rose 
Acre Far111s case to analyse Air New Zealand's actions. 
45 In examining the first limb of the test the Conmussion adopts the Chicago school 
view, as accepted by the American courts, and as applied by McGechanJ in the 
Port Ne/soil case, that an assessment of predatory pricing must be based on the costs 
and revenues associated with a full product line. That is, the predator's "overall 
price structure" must be predatory. 
46 On the facts in this case, the Conmussion considered that Air NZ would be likely 
to establish a strong case that its $299 dollar seats were not being sold below 
incremental variable cost (which would be extremely low as most of the costs of 
running the individual flights would be recovered from the seats which continued 
to be sold at the higher price). Despite the Court of Appeal's statements in the 
Port Nelson decision to the contrary, the Conmussion was clearly of the view that 
if prices were not being sold below a reasonable measure of cost,
44 
a predatory 
pricing allegation could not be supported. 
4 7 In applying the second limb of the Rose Acre Farms test, that is, whether predatory 
intent existed, the Conmussion concluded that the anecdotal evidence suggested 
aggressive competition was Air New Zealand's motivator, rather than predatory 
intent. This was demonstrated by the fact that each of Air New Zealand, Kiwi 
Airlines and Qantas had played a role in initiating price reductions. 
4
' The 
Conunission adopted a similar view to that expressed by Wilcox J in the Eastern 
Express case, and McGechan J in Port Nelson that price reductions by monopolists 
chat 
Above, n x, para 36. However, Air New Zealand was not actually required to substantiate 
prices were above incremental, or any other measure of cost. 
Para 38. 
would not be seen as inherently anti-competitive. Although, notably, the 
Commission preferred to cite American authority on this proposition, rather than 
the domestic tribunal. 4<· 
a fi nn with lauful monopoly power has no general duty to help its co111petitors, 
whether hy holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its 
co111petitive p1111ches. 
48 Moreover, in contrast to the view of McGechan J in the Eastern Express case, the 
Commission implied that even an express purpose to eliminate a con1petitor 
accompanied by an intention to recoup lost profits would not amount to predatory 
intent, in the absence of an actual ability to recoup.
47 
On the facts in this case the 
Commission had concluded that Air New Zealand was not dominant in any of the 
relevant markets and so section 36 of the Commerce Act could not apply. 
However, it is unclear whether the Commission's reasoning would be extended to 
a monopolist, given that such a purpose would appear to fall clearly within the 
proscribed purposes contained within section 36. 
49 The Commission did not address the issue of whether Air New Zealand might 
have been attempting to create a deterrent aggressive reputation; presumably 
because the Commission had already concluded that whilst barriers to entry in the 
domestic aviation market are high, such baniers in the relevant Trans-Tasman 
markets are low, which would have precluded Air New Zealand from being able 
to establish such a reputation with the ultimate aim of recoupment.
4
H 
The re,.1<11latory alld other barriers to entry are low, alld there is signif,callt colllpetition, 
bot/, art11al (partirnlarly Qa/ltas) alld potential, to provide constraints to a11y existi11g 
player. 
4') 
50 In respect of the third limb, whether recoupment in fact occurs, the Commission 
concluded that as Air New Zealand maintained Trans-Tasman fares at less than 
those prevailing prior to Kiwi Airline's entry, this tended to indicate that Air 
Oly111pi11 Eq11ip111c111 Lcasir~~ Co. 11 Wcstcm U11io11 Tclc,~raph Co., 797 F. 2d 370 (7th Cir 1986) , 
per Posner J. 
" Para 50. 
Para 15 . ,., 
Page 80, paras 8-13 . 
New Zealand was not reaping monopoly profits, nor was it reaping "high price 
later" returns. '" 
51 Given that the Conmussion had not carried out any exanunation into the 
relationship between price and cost, it is unclear how it reached the conclusion 
that Air New Zealand was not reaping monopoly profits in its overall pricing 
structure. Although, given the Conmussion's assessments of the barriers to entry, it 
presumably was of the view that recoupment was ultimately impossible. 
Above, n x, para 39. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear that both the Australian and New Zealand courts share the same 
antipathy towards explicitly incorporating the American doctrine of predatory 
pricing into the common law framework existing in those jurisdictions. 
2 The Australian and New Zealand lower courts have been prepared to utilise 
relevant elements of the American tests in order to assist in an assessment of 
whether predatory pricing has occurred in breach of the relevant statutory 
provisions, However, this approach has been openly criticised by the appellate 
tribunal in each jurisdiction. 
3 Both the Australian and New Zealand appeal courts have proved extremely 
unwilling to accept any of the elements posited in the United States as conclusive, 
or even preliminary indicators of predatory behaviour. Neither has either tribunal 
been prepared to define any alternative criteria which could be used to assist in an 
analysis of whether predatory pricing has occurred. 
4 Instead, both the Australian and New Zealand appellate courts have repeatedly 
emphasised the paramount nature of the actual elements of the relevant statutory 
provisions , and in particular the requirement for a proscribed purpose, over any 
other potentially relevant test. 
5 Whilst a reluctance to be fettered by precedents which have evolved from a 
different statutory and constitutional setting; or by quasi-scientific tests which 
purport to, but do not actually, offer objective proof of predation, is 
understandable; nevertheless the total rule of reason approach based purely on an 
analysis of purpose which has been adopted in Australia and New Zealand clearly 
has its limitations. The relevant statutory provisions provide little illumination as 
to what constitutes a predatory purpose. Moreover, mere reliance on the relevant 
firm's subjective intent may fail adequately to analyse purpose within the wider 
context of the intention to undertake a longer term predatory strategy. 
6 In the circumstances, the Australian and New Zealand courts narrow focus on a 
literal interpretation of the proscribed purposes in the statute may foreclose an 
examination of other factors which may be useful to an assessment of predation, 
including in particular, an examination via cost-based analysis, of the economic 
basis of the behaviour in question. 
7 In failing to provide any effective analytical framework for assessing the elem.ents 
necessary to prove predation, and in diminishing the significance of economic data, 
the success of such claims in Australasian jurisdictions is rendered inherently 
unlikely . 
8 Ultimately, this may be an intentional manifestation of the underlying ideological 
position prevailing in those jurisdictions, which reflects the philosophical attitude 
prevalent in the United States, that predatory pricing by a market dominant firm is 
inherently economically irrational and unlikely to occur; accompanied by a m.arked 
reluctance to regard low prices as potentially damaging to consumer welfare. 
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